The AI Engine for WordPress plugin contains a vulnerability in its image insertion feature that allows any authenticated user with post editing capabilities (Contributor, Author, Editor, Administrator) to download arbitrary files from the server. The vulnerability stems from the lqdai_update_post AJAX endpoint lacking proper capability checks and the insert_image() function using file_get_contents() with user-controlled URLs without protocol validation, allowing arbitrary file downloads via the file:// protocol.
TL;DR Exploits
A POC CVE-2025-13380.py is provided to demonstrate a Contributor level user downloading the site’s wp-config.php file.
python3 ./exploit.py http://techcorp.cc contributor password
[+] Target: http://techcorp.cc
[+] Username: contributor
[+] Nonce obtained: 5dc61a0166
[+] Post created with ID: 148
[+] File written to uploads directory
[+] Attempting to retrieve file from: http://techcorp.cc/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/varwwwhtmlwp-config.php.jpg
[+] File retrieved successfully!
[+] wp-config.php contents:
<?php
/**
* The base configuration for WordPress
*
* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file during the installation.
* You don't have to use the website, you can copy this file to "wp-config.php"
* and fill in the values.
*
* This file contains the following configurations:
*
* * Database settings
* * Secret keys
...
...
...
Details
File Insert Function
The lqdai_update_post AJAX action calls the update_post() function on line 315 of /wp-content/plugins/liquid-chatgpt/liquid-chatgpt.php, which lacks proper capability checks and allows any authenticated user to modify posts they can edit:
The WPBookit plugin does not validate user permission or sanitize custom CSS/JS code in its save_custome_code AJAX endpoint, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes on every page load, leading to stored XSS and potential session hijacking.
The vulnerability exists in the save_custome_code method of the WPB_Setting_Controller class. The plugin registers AJAX endpoints for unauthenticated users, allowing any visitor to inject arbitrary CSS/JS code that gets executed on every page load.
The WordPress S2B AI Assistant plugin (versions 2.47 and prior) contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability that allows authenticated WordPress users with Editor role or higher to upload malicious PHP files to the server, potentially leading to remote code execution.
TL;DR Exploits
A POC CVE-2025-12973.py is provided to demonstrate a remote attacker uploading shell.php and executing remote code:
The vulnerability exists in the Utils.php file at the storeFile() method, which is called by the /wp-admin/admin-post.php endpoint with action s2b_store_chatbot_upload. The upload functionality uses a custom file extension whitelist that explicitly allows dangerous file types including PHP files. This allows authenticated WordPress users with Editor role or higher to upload arbitrary files, including PHP files that can be executed on the server.
The WordPress Alex Reservations plugin (versions 2.2.3 and prior) contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability that allows authenticated WordPress administrators to upload malicious PHP files to the server, potentially leading to remote code execution.
TL;DR Exploits
A POC CVE-2025-12399.py is provided to demonstrate a remote attacker uploading shell.php and executing remote code:
The vulnerability exists in the UploadFileController.php file at the /wp-json/srr/v1/app/upload/file endpoint. The upload functionality lacks proper file validation and only performs basic filename sanitization using a regex pattern. This allows authenticated WordPress administrators to upload arbitrary files, including PHP files that can be executed on the server.
The StoreEngine plugin contains a vulnerability in it’s CSV Import/Export feature that allows any authenticated user (subscriber, author, editor, etc.) to upload arbitrary files and gain remote code execution. The vulnerability stems from two security flaws: (1) the CSV import endpoint lacks proper file validation checks, permission checks, and only relies on nonce verification for security, and (2) the storeengine_nonce is exposed to ALL frontend users through the plugin’s JavaScript. This combination allows any authenticated user to extract the nonce from frontend pages and use it to upload PHP web shells via the storeengine_csv/import endpoint, effectively granting subscriber+ users the ability to execute arbitrary code on the server.